measure that allows prosecutors in Suriname to deny a detained suspect any communication with the outside world, including access to legal counsel.

Dubois, a member of the Bar Association of Suriname and an attorney-at-law for more than 17 years, submitted a detailed expert statement in proceedings before the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) in the case of Derek Ramsamooj v. The State of Suriname. His opinion, spanning multiple areas of domestic and international law, questions the compatibility of the “beperking” practice with constitutional and treaty-based human rights protections.

A Measure Without Judicial Oversight
In his statement, Dubois explained that the “beperking” measure is based on Article 40(2) of the Surinamese Code of Criminal Procedure, which empowers prosecutors to prohibit communication between a suspect and their lawyer if such contact could allegedly obstruct an investigation. However, the measure can be imposed for up to eight days — and crucially, without the prior authorization or review of a judge.

According to Dubois, this grants prosecutors the authority to restrict a fundamental right — access to legal counsel — without judicial supervision, effectively creating conditions akin to “incommunicado detention.”

“In at least four previous cases in which I was involved,” Dubois noted, “the Court of Justice found such ‘beperking’ orders to be unlawful and lifted them for failing to specify grounds or justify their duration.”

Violation of International Human Rights Standards
Drawing on international jurisprudence, Dubois compared the “beperking” measure to forms of secret or incommunicado detention condemned by the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).

He cited UN findings that prolonged isolation and denial of access to legal counsel constitute arbitrary detention and may amount to cruel or inhuman treatment. In particular, he referred to the Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador case (2007), where the IACtHR ruled that holding suspects incommunicado violated their dignity and amounted to unlawful deprivation of liberty.

“The ‘beperking’ deprives suspects not only of liberty but also of the protection of law,” Dubois emphasized, adding that international law views such isolation as inherently arbitrary and unlawful.

Conflict with Suriname’s Treaty Obligations
Dubois also underscored that Suriname’s Constitution establishes a monistic legal system, meaning that ratified treaties — such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) — have direct effect in domestic law and rank above national statutes.

Articles 7 and 9 of the ICCPR guarantee the right to liberty, prompt judicial review, and protection from cruel or degrading treatment. “The ‘beperking’ measure,” Dubois argued, “conflicts with these obligations, as it allows prosecutors, not judges, to authorize restrictions on liberty.”

A Colonial Legacy Without Reform
The “beperking” measure, Dubois explained, is a legacy of Dutch colonial law. While the Netherlands abolished its equivalent provision (Article 50 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure) in 2017 after introducing judicial oversight in 2000, Suriname never reformed its law, leaving prosecutors unchecked.

“The Dutch system evolved to require a court to review any such order immediately,” Dubois noted. “That safeguard is missing in Suriname.”

Implications for the Ramsamooj Case
The Ramsamooj case before the CCJ challenges the lawfulness of Suriname’s use of the “beperking” order during his 2020 detention. The claimant alleges that he was held incommunicado for several days without access to his lawyer — a practice Dubois equates with arbitrary detention under international standards.

Dubois’s expert statement is expected to play a pivotal role as the CCJ examines whether Suriname’s criminal procedure complies with regional and international human rights norms. His analysis suggests that without judicial oversight, the “beperking” order remains a relic of colonial law that has no place in a modern democratic justice system.

“Any restriction of liberty that lacks judicial review or proportional justification,” Dubois concluded, “is inherently arbitrary and violates both domestic and international law.”